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INTRODUCTION
There are several employment discrimination statutes that
together seek to safeguard equality in the workplace. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' addresses discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967' (ADEA) addresses age discrimination.
Both statutes make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee "because of' a protected characteristic. They
also prohibit retaliation against an employee "because" the employee
opposed a discriminatory practice.4 In Price Waterhouse v Hopkins,'
the Supreme Court first interpreted the words "because of" in the
discrimination provision of Title VII as establishing a burden-shifting
framework.' This framework allows the employee to shift the burden
of proof to her employer by showing that a protected characteristic
played some part in the employer's decision to take an adverse action
f BA 2009, University of Notre Dame; JD Candidate 2012, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 Pub L No 88-352,78 Stat 253, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
2 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 621-34.
3 See 42 USC § 2000e-2(a);29 USC § 623(a).
4 See 42 USC § 2000e-3(a); 29 USC § 623(d).
5 490 US 228 (1989).
6 There are two separate types of burden shifting available in employment discrimination
cases. This Comment uses the term "burden shifting" only in the mixed-motive sense-meaning
when the plaintiff shifts the burden of proof to the employer by showing that a protected
characteristic played a part in the employer's decision to take adverse action against the
employee. The other approach involves so-called "pretext" claims. See McDonnell Douglas Corp
v Green, 411 US 792, 802-03 (1973). A pretext claim involves the plaintiff making out a prima
facie case of discrimination, which then requires the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the employer does so, then the burden of proof returns
to the plaintiff, who must prove that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. Although the
Supreme Court did not address the continuing viability of the McDonnell Douglas pretext
framework in Gross v FBL Financial Services, Inc, 129 S Ct 2343 (2009), lower courts that have
faced the issue continue to apply the pretext analysis. See, for example, Gorzynski v Jetblue
Airways Corp, 596 F3d 93, 106 (2d Cir 2010); Geiger v Tower Automotive, 579 F3d 614, 622
(6th Cir 2009); Smith v City ofAllentown, 589 F3d 684,691 (3d Cir 2009).
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against her, such as discharge or demotion. Yet in the ADEA context,
"because of" was later interpreted by the Court in Gross v FBL
Financial Services, Inc' as requiring that the employee prove that age
was a but-for cause of the employer's decision, without the aid of
burden shifting.' In Gross, the Supreme Court reasoned that, because
Congress codified the burden-shifting framework for Title VII
discrimination claims in response to Price Waterhouse,o but did not
similarly amend the ADEA, the burden-shifting framework is
unavailable in the age discrimination context."
Whether the pro-employee burden shifting of Price Waterhouse
or the pro-employer standard of Gross should govern Title VII
retaliation claims has currently split the lower courts. Three district
courts hold that, because Congress codified burden shifting only for
Title VII discrimination claims, the plaintiff cannot utilize burden
shifting in the retaliation context.12 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
asserts that, unless Congress has explicitly provided otherwise, the
plaintiff-employee must prove but-for causation, without any burden
shifting, "in all suits under federal law."" By contrast, the Fifth Circuit
and a fourth district court follow the earlier precedent of Price
Waterhouse-which Gross did not explicitly overturn-by applying
burden shifting in the Title VII retaliation context." What remains of
Price Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework, and whether and
to what extent the logic of Gross applies to Title VII, is the subject of
this Comment.
The allocation of the burden of proof has important
consequences for employees' ultimate success at trial." In recent years,
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases have fared increasingly
poorly in federal court." In 2010, Senators Tom Harkin, Patrick Leahy,
7 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 244-45 (plurality).
8 129 S Ct 2343 (2009).
9 Id at 2350-51.
10 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), Pub L No 102-166,105 Stat 1071,1075, codified at
42 USC § 2000e-2(m).
11 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349.
12 See Zhang v Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 2011 WL 940237, *2 (ED Pa); Hayes v
Sebelius, 762 F Supp 2d 90,111-13 (DDC 2011); Beckford v Giethner, 661 F Supp 2d 17,25 n 3
(DDC 2009).
13 Fairley v Andrews, 578 F3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir 2009). See also Serwatka v Rockwell
Automation, Inc, 591 F3d 957,961-62 (7th Cir 2010).
14 See Smith v Xerox Corp, 602 F3d 320,325-30 (5th Cir 2010); Nuskey v Hochberg, 730 F
Supp 2d 1, 5 (DDC 2010).
15 See David Sherwyn and Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof-
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination
Case Outcomes, 42 Ariz St L J 901, 933-37 (2010).
16 See Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Hary J L & Pub Pol 103,104-05 (2009).
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and George Miller proposed an amendment to the ADEA that would
overturn Gross," but the bill died in committee." Moreover, even if it
is enacted in the future, the proposed bill says nothing about the
retaliation provision of Title VII. Lower courts, then, are tasked with
deciding whether the burden-shifting framework of Price Waterhouse
still protects employees who are subject to retaliation.
Part I places Gross in context by reviewing the statutory
framework of Title VII and the ADEA and the interaction between
the Supreme Court and Congress that led to the current split. Part II
traces the development of the current split in the lower courts. Part III
shows that, despite its complicated history, the recent split boils down
to a single issue: the original scope of Price Waterhouse, the Supreme
Court's first take on the meaning of "because" in Title VII. Part III
also shows that, rather than grappling with this underlying question,
lower courts favoring the broad application of Gross and its
requirement of but-for causation proved solely by the plaintiff have
either explicitly or implicitly assumed that Price Waterhouse originally
applied only to discrimination- and not retaliation-claims. Similarly,
courts applying Price Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework
to retaliation claims have necessarily assumed-so far, without
analysis-that Price Waterhouse originally applied to all of Title VII.
Part IV then explores the scope of Price Waterhouse to determine
whether, at the time it was decided, it applied to all of Title VII or just
to the discrimination section. Ultimately, Part IV argues that Price
Waterhouse originally applied throughout Title VII and that, because
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has touched the retaliation
provision since Price Waterhouse was decided, its burden-shifting
framework necessarily continues to govern Title VII retaliation claims.
I. BACKGROUND: PUTTING GROSS IN CONTEXT
A. The Statutory Framework of Title VII and the ADEA
In different sections, Title VII prohibits both discrimination and
retaliation by employers. Under Title VII's discrimination provision, it
17 See Protecting Older Workers against Discrimination Act, HR 3721, 111th Cong,
1st Sess, in 155 Cong Rec H 10518 (daily ed Oct 6,2009) (introducing a bill "[t]o amend the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to clarify the appropriate [mixed-motive] standard of
proof"). Some commentators have argued that Gross was simply wrongly decided and have
urged congressional intervention. See, for example, Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard
in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,58 Buff L Rev 69,70 (2010).
18 See H.R. 3721: Protecting Older Workers against Discrimination Act (GovTrack 2011),
online at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hlll-3721 (visited Apr 18,2011).
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is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."" Under Title VII's retaliation provision, it is unlawful "for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing."20
Other federal statutes establish similar prohibitions against
discrimination.21 In particular, the ADEA makes it unlawful "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual's age."2 This
language is identical to that in Title VII." The question, then, is to what
extent these identical terms should be interpreted identically.
B. Price Waterhouse: The Origin of Title VII Burden Shifting
The puzzle begins-and, as Part III shows, ultimately ends-with
Price Waterhouse, a case involving the discrimination provision of
Title VII. A female plaintiff was refused entry into the partnership at
Ernst & Young at least in part because she was deemed insufficiently
ladylike. Among other things, one of her evaluators said that to
improve her chances, she should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry."24 A plurality of the Supreme Court led by Justice
William Brennan began by considering the language of Title VII and
what Congress meant when it said that an employer could not
discriminate against an employee "because of' a protected
characteristic. The Court said that "[w]e take these words to mean that
gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions" and thereafter
explicitly dismissed an interpretation of "because" that required "but-
for" causation.
19 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
20 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
21 While several statutes are potentially affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Gross,
this Comment focuses on Title VII, because Title VII and the ADEA are the cornerstones of
employment discrimination law, generating the most lawsuits by far. See William R. Corbett,
Babbling about Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder Understand the
Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U Pa J Bus L 683,692-93 n 39 (2010).
22 29 USC § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
23 See 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (discrimination); 42 USC § 2000e-3(a) (retaliation).
24 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 235 (plurality).
25 Id at 240. But see id at 281 (Kennedy dissenting) (observing that the plurality's test, in
operation if not in name, does in fact require but-for causation, because the employer who can
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Instead, the Court created a burden-shifting framework: to
establish liability, a Title VII plaintiff need only show that a protected
characteristic was a substantial factor-not necessarily the decisive
one-in the employer's decision.2 But the Court also held that it is a
complete defense if the employer can then show by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have made the same decision regardless
of its consideration of the protected characteristic." The plurality
reasoned that this result best reflected "Title VII's balance between
employee rights and employer prerogatives."" Thus, Price Waterhouse
makes the employee's initial burden of proof easier to meet, while
allowing employers-who have greater access to the necessary
proof'-to absolve themselves by showing that the employee was
actually fired, demoted, or otherwise acted against for legitimate
reasons, despite the illicit consideration of a protected characteristic.
Ultimately, six justices agreed that the burden-shifting framework with
a complete defense for the employer who could disprove but-for
causation was the proper interpretation of the word "because."'"
Although Price Waterhouse arose in the context of a Title VII
discrimination claim, the Supreme Court relied on the legislative
history of all of Title VII and used broad language potentially
indicative of an intention to make burden shifting applicable
throughout Title VII, including the retaliation provision. As Part II
will show, this uncertainty over the original scope of Price Waterhouse
is at the heart of the current split in the lower courts.
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Congress Amends Title VII to
Codify Burden Shifting
Congress responded in 1991 by amending the discrimination
provision of Title VII to create a burden-shifting framework even
disprove causation has a complete defense); id at 262-63 (O'Connor concurring) (arguing that
the words "because of" require but-for causation given the legislative history of Title VH, which
"makes it clear that Congress was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the
employment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts").
26 See id at 241 (plurality).
27 See id at 258.
28 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 242-43 (plurality).
29 See, for example, United States Postal Service Board of Governors v Aikens, 460 US 711,
716 (1983) ("[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and
difficult.... There will seldom be'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.").
30 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241-42 (plurality); id at 259-60 (White concurring); id
at 276 (O'Connor concurring) (agreeing with Justice Byron White and the plurality and adding
that the plaintiff must prove by "direct evidence," rather than mere inferences, "that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision"). For a summary of the "splintered"
Price Waterhouse decision, see Gross, 129 S Ct at 2347.
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more friendly to employees than the Price Waterhouse scheme." The
Civil Rights Act of 1991" ("1991 Act") codified the Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting approach33 by adding a new provision allowing the
plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendant by
"demonstrat[ing] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice."" And even where the employer is
then able to carry its burden of proof by disproving but-for causation,
the 1991 Act added a second provision35 providing for limited
remedies-declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and fees and
costs-in contrast to the complete defense awarded to the employer
under Price Waterhouse." Yet while Congress explicitly rejected the
but-for interpretation of the words "because of" for Title VII
discrimination claims, the newly added provisions failed to address
the Title VII retaliation section," the ADEA,39 and every other
employment discrimination statute."
As a result of this selective amendment process, it is unclear
whether and how the 1991 Act affects the interpretation of "because"
in other contexts." There are three possibilities. The first is that the
31 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, HR Rep No 102-40, 102d Cong, 1st Sess 47-48 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 USCCAN 549,583-87 (emphasizing that Price Waterhouse implicitly condones
racism and sexism so long as it is not the causal factor and finding that "[i]egislation is needed to
restore Title VII's comprehensive ban on all impermissible consideration of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin in employment"). See also Beckham v National Railroad Passenger Corp,
736 F Supp 2d 130, 142 (DDC 2010) (noting that "Congress [in 1991] approved the first of these
points [burden shifting], but not the second [the employer's complete defense]").
32 Pub L No 102-166,105 Stat 1071, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
33 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a)-(b), 105 Stat at 1075-76, codified as amended at 42
USC §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5(g). See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2356 (Stevens dissenting) (referring to
"Congress' partial ratification of Price Waterhouse" in the 1991 Act).
34 42 USC § 2000e-2(m).
35 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
36 See HR Rep No 102-40 at 44 (cited in note 31) (noting the need to overturn the but-for
aspect of Price Waterhouse and replace it with a more lenient standard that awards at least some
relief where consideration of a protected characteristic "actually contributed or was otherwise a
factor in an employment decision or action").
37 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 281 (Kennedy dissenting) ("By any normal
understanding, the phrase 'because of' conveys the idea that the motive in question made a
difference to the outcome.").
38 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
39 29 USC § 623(a).
40 See, for example, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 103(a), Pub L No 101-336,
104 Stat 327,331-32 (prohibiting employment discrimination "against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability"); Equal Pay Act of 1963 § 2, Pub L No 88-38, 77 Stat 56,
56-57, codified in relevant part at 29 USC § 206(d). See also Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 §§ 202-03, Pub L No 110-233, 122 Stat 881, 907-09, codified in
relevant part at 42 USC § 2000ff-4.
41 It appears that this circumstance is not unique. Professor Deborah Widiss has explored
the difficulty Congress experiences in attempting to override judicial decisions. She points out
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failure to amend the other statutes was simply a mistake, and the
"motivating factor" standard should apply universally.4 2 The second
possibility is that, by not amending the other employment statutes,
Congress acquiesced to the application of Price Waterhouse's burden-
shifting framework as the proper interpretation of "because" in all
unamended contexts. The third possibility is that the 1991 Act rejected
both Price Waterhouse and the amended framework in contexts
untouched by Congress, thus giving the courts license to create a new,
third interpretation of "because." In sum, Congress's selective
amendment of Title VII has given rise to substantial confusion
concerning the continued viability of Price Waterhouse. "
D. In the Interim: Lower Courts Apply Price Waterhouse
Everywhere
After the 1991 Act, several district courts embraced the first
possibility. They held that the amended burden-shifting framework of
the 1991 Act-including its partial remedies where the employer
disproves but-for causation-applied not just to Title VII discrimination
claims, but also to Title VII retaliation claims." Every court of appeals to
address the issue, however, adopted the second possibility: that the 1991
Act does not apply to retaliation claims, for the simple reason that the
newly added provisions explicitly apply only to discrimination claims.45
that Congress often amends one statute to purportedly overrule a Supreme Court decision,
which then leaves the lower courts unsure of how to apply the overruled precedent in related
(and unamended) contexts. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of
Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 511, 523
(2009) (observing that lower courts often interpret congressional overrides as narrow exceptions
to general precedents and continue to apply the "overruled" precedent in other contexts even
when it is doubtful that this is what Congress intended).
42 It is entirely possible, as some commentators have suggested, that Congress's failure to
codify the new burden-shifting framework in other contexts was just "a glaring oversight." See
Thomas H. Barnard and George S. Crisci, "Mixed-Motive" Discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991: Still a "Pyrrhic Victory"for Plaintiffs?, 51 Mercer L Rev 673,687-90 (2000).
43 See Widiss, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 514 (cited in note 41) ("[Blecause Congress
technically cannot overrule judicial decisions, the interpretation of overrides poses a particular
challenge within a judicial system that is built on adherence to precedent.").
44 See De Llano v North Dakota State University, 951 F Supp 168, 170-71 (D ND 1997)
(asserting that it would be "illogical and contrary to congressional intent to apply different
standards of proof and accompanying relief provisions to retaliation claims as opposed to
discrimination claims"); Heywood v Samaritan Health System, 902 F Supp 1076,1080-81 (D Ariz
1995) (quoting the legislative history of the 1991 Act for the proposition that Congress intended
to overrule Price Waterhouse, which makes it "reasonable to assume" that the amended
framework is also meant to apply to retaliation claims).
45 See Tanca v Nordberg, 98 F3d 680,682-84 (1st Cir 1996); Matima v Celli, 228 F3d 68,81
(2d Cir 2000); Woodson v Scott Paper Co, 109 F3d 913, 931-35 (3d Cir 1997); Kubicko v Ogden
Logistics Services, 181 F3d 544, 552 n 7 (4th Cir 1999); Speedy v Rexnord Corp, 243 F3d 397,
401-02 (7th Cir 2001); Norbeck v Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 215 F3d 848, 852 (8th Cir
2000); Pennington v City of Huntsville, 261 F3d 1262,1269 (11th Cir 2001).
The University of Chicago Law Review
Instead, every court of appeals (with the exception of the DC Circuit,
where the issue remained open) continued to apply the Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting framework (and its complete defense for
employers) to Title VII retaliation claims after 1991.46 In the ADEA
context, the courts of appeals similarly applied Price Waterhouse and its
burden-shifting framework to age discrimination claims. In effect, the
lower courts decided that Congress's selective amendment of Title VII
implicitly affirmed the application of Price Waterhouse as the proper
interpretation of "because" in all unamended contexts.
E. Gross: Providing Clarity or Creating Confusion?
In Gross, the Supreme Court decided otherwise, holding that
"because" in the ADEA means that the plaintiff must prove but-for
causation without the aid of burden shifting. The plaintiff in Gross had
been reassigned from director to coordinator and some of his previous
responsibilities were transferred to a fellow employee in a newly
created position.48 Although both the plaintiff and the other employee
received the same salary, he considered the change a demotion,
because he had lost some of his responsibilities. The plaintiff was fifty-
four years old, while his coworker was in her early forties. The plaintiff
alleged that he had been demoted at least in part because of his age in
violation of the ADEA.49
The Court held in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas that
a mixed-motive jury instruction was never proper in a suit brought
under the ADEA." The Court, relying on the dictionary definition "by
46 In addition to the cases cited in note 45, see Fabela v Socorro Independent School
District, 329 F3d 409,414-15 (5th Cir 2003); Smith v City of Salem, 378 F3d 566,574-76 (6th Cir
2004); Stegall v Citadel Broadcasting Co, 350 F3d 1061, 1071-72 (9th Cir 2003); Fye v Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, 516 F3d 1217,1224-25 (10th Cir 2008). For a review of these interim
decisions, see Barnard and Crisci, 51 Mercer L Rev at 687-90 (cited in note 42).
47 See Febres v Challenger Caribbean Corp, 214 F3d 57, 60 (1st Cir 2000); Ostrowski v
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co, 968 F2d 171, 180-81 (2d Cir 1992); Starceski v Westinghouse
Electric Corp, 54 F3d 1089, 1095-98 (3d Cir 1995); EEOC v Warfield-Rohr Casket Co,
364 F3d 160,164 n 2 (4th Cir 2004); Rachid v Jack in the Box, Inc, 376 F3d 305,309 (5th Cir 2004);
Wexler v White's Fine Furniture, Inc, 317 F3d 564, 571-72 (6th Cir 2003); Visser v Packer
Engineering Associates, Inc, 924 F2d 655, 658 (7th Cir 1991) (en banc); Hutson v McDonnell
Douglas Corp, 63 F3d 771,780 (8th Cir 1995); Lewis v YMCA, 208 F3d 1303, 1305-06 (11th Cir
2000) (per curiam). See also Gross, 129 S Ct at 2354-55 (Stevens dissenting) ("[Tihe Courts of
Appeals to have considered the issue [of whether to apply burden shifting in the age
discrimination context] unanimously have applied Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims."). Gross
overruled these previous cases.
48 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2346.
49 See id at 2346-47.
50 See id at 2350-51.
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reason of: on account of,"" interpreted the word "because" in the
ADEA according to its "ordinary meaning" of outcome
determinative. Using that interpretation, the Court held that ADEA
plaintiffs must prove that an unlawful motive was a "but-for" cause of
the employer's decision. Thus the Court declined to apply the more
plaintiff-friendly burden-shifting framework of either Price
Waterhouse or the 1991 Act to age discrimination claims."
In doing so, the Court distinguished between the ADEA and
Title VII." The Court observed that Congress amended Title VII in
1991 to codify burden shifting where discrimination was a "motivating
factor" in an employment decision." However, the Court emphasized
that Congress did not similarly amend the ADEA, even though
Congress amended the ADEA contemporaneously for other reasons,
creating a strong inference that Congress did not simply forget to
codify burden shifting in the age discrimination context." Based on
this textual discrepancy, the Court held that "[the] interpretation of
the ADEA is not governed by Title VII decisions such as ... Price
Waterhouse.""
The Court went on to criticize the practical value of Price
Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework, observing that "it has
become evident in the years since that case was decided that its burden-
shifting framework is difficult to apply."" The Court noted that judges
have often struggled to formulate jury instructions that adequately
explain burden shifting. "Thus," the Court concluded, "the problems
associated with [Price Waterhouse's] application have eliminated any
perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims.""
Significantly, however, at no point did the Court explicitly overrule
Price Waterhouse. By contrast, the Court was careful to note that it had
not previously applied the burden-shifting framework of Price
Waterhouse to the ADEA and "declined to do so now."
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens criticized the majority's
decision to interpret "because" as requiring but-for causation when
Price Waterhouse interpreted identical language as prohibiting
51 Id at 2350, citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 194 (Merriam-Webster 3d ed
1966).
52 Gross, 129 S Ct at 2350.
53 See id at 2352.
54 See id at 2349.
5s See 42 USC § 2000e-2(m).
56 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349.
57 Id.
58 Id at 2352.
59 Id (emphasis added).
6o Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349.
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"adverse employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the age
of the employee."" Justice Stephen Breyer, joining Justice Stevens but
also writing separately, noted the difficulty of attributing but-for
causation to any one particular factor when mental motivations for
employment decisions are at issue.62 In contrast to torts or other
instances of physical causation, where "reasonably objective and
commonsense theories" provide judges with tools of analysis, it is
difficult for the plaintiff to know, and much less to prove, precisely
which factor led his employer to fire him."
II. APPLYING GROSS: UNCERTAINTY IN THE LOWER COURTS
This new interpretation of "because" has led to conflict in the
lower courts. The confusion concerns whether Gross or Price
Waterhouse applies in the Title VII retaliation context. Three district
courts have held that Gross dictates the death of Price Waterhouse and
its burden-shifting framework for Title VII retaliation claims." The
Fifth Circuit, by contrast, reasoned that because Gross distinguished
between the ADEA and Title VII, the Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting framework continues to govern retaliation claims." This Part
shows that in both cases, lurking beneath the surface is an
unrecognized-yet fundamental-disagreement about the scope of
Price Waterhouse and whether its burden-shifting framework
originally applied to all of Title VII or only the discrimination
provision. Part III then shows why, although it is often assumed or
even left unstated in the opinions, the crucial question in the Title VII
retaliation context is the original scope of Price Waterhouse.
61 Id at 2353-54 (Stevens dissenting) (emphasis added) (lamenting that "the majority's
inattention to prudential Court practices is matched by its utter disregard of our precedent and
Congress' intent").
62 See id at 2358-59 (Breyer dissenting). See also Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-
in-Fact, 9 Stan L Rev 60,67 (1956) (arguing that forcing the plaintiff to pry into the thoughts of
the defendant sets up the "impossible" task of "prob[ing] into a purely fanciful and unknowable
state of affairs").
63 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2358-59 (Breyer dissenting) ("Sometimes we speak of
determining or discovering motives, but more often we ascribe motives, after an event, to an
individual in light of the individual's thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of
decision.").
6 See Zhang v Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 2011 WL 940237, *2 (ED Pa); Hayes v
Sebelius, 272 F Supp 2d 90, 111-13 (DDC 2011); Beckford v Giethner, 661 F Supp 2d, 25 n 3
(DDC 2009).
65 See Smith v Xerox Corp, 602 F3d 320,329-30 (5th Cir 2010).
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A. Retaliation Plaintiffs Must Prove But-for Causation without
Burden Shifting
Representative of the cases applying Gross and its requirement
of but-for causation proved solely by the plaintiff to Title VII
retaliation claims is Hayes v Sebelius," a recent district court decision
in the District of Columbia. In Hayes, the plaintiff alleged both
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII when his
employer failed to promote him and gave him low performance
ratings.6 Although there was little argument that the employee who
was promoted instead of Hayes was more qualified, there was
evidence in the record that Hayes's boss was biased against him
because Hayes had previously brought a successful discrimination
complaint against him. Hayes's boss admitted that he did not bother
"look[ing] into Mr. Hayes' background," because Hayes "didn't get
put [in his current position] because of any merit. It was because of an
EEO settlement."o Moreover, fellow employees testified that Hayes's
boss was "very upset" by the earlier verdict and that the boss
considered Hayes's action in bringing the original case "morally
repugnant."" One question the court faced was whether Hayes could
shift the burden of proof to his employer by showing that retaliation
played a part in the employer's decision.
The court ruled that, after the 1991 Act and Gross, Price
Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework are no longer
applicable to Title VII retaliation claims.72 The court began by
observing that "Price Waterhouse arose in the context of a
discrimination claim, but the DC Circuit subsequently extended its
burden-shifting framework to retaliation cases [in the context of a
pre-1991 retaliation claim] as well."" In doing so, the court
unceremoniously assumed that Price Waterhouse, at the time it was
decided, was limited by its terms to only the discrimination provision
66 272FSupp2d90 (DDC2011).
67 For another recent decision applying Gross and its requirement of but-for causation
proved solely by the plaintiff to a Title VII retaliation claim (albeit one with a very sparse
analysis of the issue), see Beckford, 661 F Supp 2d at 25 n 3.
68 Hayes, 272 F Supp 2d at 93 (involving a claim against the Secretary of Health and
Human Services).
69 Id at 95.
70 Id at 105.
71 Id.
72 Hayes,272 F Supp 2d at 111-13.
73 Id at 109-10. The word "extended" here is critical: if Price Waterhouse originally applied
only to discrimination claims, and it was only the subsequent extension of the logic of Price
Waterhouse to retaliation claims that made Price Waterhouse relevant in the retaliation context,
then the reasoning of Gross now dictates that lower courts reverse those prior "extension"
decisions. See Part III.B.
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of Title VII, asserting that "[b]oth Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Amendments [ ] dealt only with Title VII discrimination claims.""
The court then considered the continued viability of the DC
Circuit's extension of Price Waterhouse and its burden-shifting
framework to retaliation claims in light of the 1991 Act and Gross. The
court observed that the "language [of the ADEA] is indistinguishable
from Title VII's discrimination and retaliation provisions, both of
which contain the same 'because of' formulation."" More importantly,
the Supreme Court in Gross was critical of its earlier decision in Price
Waterhouse, declaring that its burden-shifting framework was difficult
to apply and that "the problems associated with Price Waterhouse
have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to
ADEA claims."" As a result, the court reasoned, "Gross [ ] makes
clear that Price Waterhouse's interpretation of 'because of' is flatly
incorrect.""
The court went on to reject the argument that the 1991 Act (and
its limited remedies even where the employer disproves but-for
causation) apply to retaliation claims. Quoting Gross, it reasoned that
"[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it
is presumed to have acted intentionally."" By its terms, the 1991 Act
applies only to discrimination claims." Moreover, the Court in Gross
stressed the fact that Title VII and the ADEA were amended
simultaneously in 1991, prompting the Hayes court to point out that
"[tlhis argument applies with even greater force to [Title VII's
retaliation provision]."' Furthermore, if burden shifting already
applied to all of Title VII in 1991, then Congress would not have
needed to add a provision specifying that burden shifting is available
for discrimination claims; Congress could have simply added the
limited remedies provision alone." Finally, the court observed that "if
Congress had wanted to mention motivating-factor claims in
Title VII's retaliation provision, it knew how to do so."" Because
Congress left out retaliation, the amended burden-shifting framework
does not apply.
74 Hayes,272 F Supp 2d at 110.
75 Id at 111.
76 Id, citing Gross, 129 S Ct at 2351-52 ("[I]t is far from clear that the Court would have
the same approach were it to consider the question [of Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting
framework] today in the first instance.").
77 Hayes,272 F Supp 2d at 111.
78 Id at 112, quoting Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349.
79 See 42 USC § 200e-2(m).
s0 Hayes,272 F Supp 2d at 113.
81 See id.
82 Id.
[78:10311042
2011] The Meaning of "Because" in Employment Discrimination Law 1043
In another recent case, the district court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania similarly ruled that Gross dictates that but-for
causation proved solely by the plaintiff governs Title VII retaliation
claims." In Zhang v Children's Hospital of Philadelphia," the plaintiff
argued that he was entitled to a mixed-motive (burden-shifting) jury
instruction on his retaliation claim because the Third Circuit's Model
Civil Jury Instructions provide that "a mixed-motive standard could
be appropriate in Title VII retaliation cases 'if warranted by the
evidence.'". The court pointed out that the Third Circuit's Committee
on Model Civil Jury Instructions has not yet decided whether Gross
affects the availability of burden shifting under Title VII; moreover,
"the comments conclude with the suggestion that the 'users of these
instructions should consider that question.'". Thus, the court felt
compelled to answer the question itself.
Mirroring Hayes, the court in Zhang repeated the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the "ordinary meaning" of "because" as
requiring but-for causation." The court then reviewed another recent
case in its district, Warshaw v Concentra Health Services," in which the
court applied Gross to a claim under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990" (ADA). The Warshaw court emphasized that the ADA,
like the ADEA, was not amended along with Title VII's
discrimination provision in 1991. Moreover, both the ADA and the
ADEA "use[] the term 'because' to describe the causal connection
required between an employee's protected activity and an employer's
adverse action."" The court held that Gross and its requirement of
but-for causation proved solely by the plaintiff governs ADA claims."
Convinced by this reasoning, the Zhang court found "no compelling
reason to define 'because,' as used in Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision, any differently than the Supreme Court defined the phrase
'because of' in Gross."
Outside the Title VII retaliation context, the Seventh Circuit has
interpreted Gross in a similarly expansive fashion, holding that
"unless a statute (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides
83 See Zhang, 2011 WL 940237 at *2.
8 2011 WL 940237 (ED Pa).
85 Id at *1, quoting Third Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions § 5.1.7 (2010).
86 Zhang, 2011 WL 940237 at *1, quoting Third Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions
§ 5.1.7 (2010).
8 Zhang,2011 WL 940237 at *1, quoting Gross, 129 S Ct at 2350-51.
88 719 F Supp 2d 484 (ED Pa 2010).
89 Pub L No 101-336,104 Stat 327, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
90 Zhang, 2011 WL 940237 at *2, citing Warshaw, 719 F Supp 2d at 503.
91 Warshaw, 719 F Supp 2d at 503.
9 Zhang, 2011 VL 940237 at *2.
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otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the plaintiff's
burden in all suits under federal law."9 3 In Fairley v Andrews,4 two
Chicago prison guards quit their jobs and sued after their peers
allegedly taunted and threatened to kill them for reporting prisoner
abuse by fellow guards." They alleged a violation of their right to free
speech under 42 USC § 1983. In the past, courts have applied the same
burden-shifting framework from employment discrimination cases
(like Price Waterhouse) to First Amendment retaliation claims." But
Judge Frank Easterbrook held that "[t]hese decisions do not survive
Gross," and remanded the case in part so that the jury could be
instructed that the plaintiff must prove but-for causation alone."
A few months later, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Fairley and its
broad application of the but-for causation requirement in the context
of the ADA. In Serwatka v Rockwell Automation, Inc," the jury
returned a special verdict finding that the plaintiff had been fired in
part because of her disability, but also that her former employer would
have fired her anyway." The Seventh Circuit held that, because the
ADA prohibited discrimination against an employee "because of" her
disability," but-for causation was required.' The Serwatka court
reasoned that "[a]lthough the Gross decision construed the ADEA,
the importance that the court attached to the express incorporation of
the mixed-motive framework into Title VII suggests that when
another anti-discrimination statute lacks comparable language, a
mixed-motive claim will not be viable under that statute.",o2 Because
the ADA did not also incorporate something akin to the "motivating
factor" provision of Title VII, the court refused to allow burden
shifting."' Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to consider a Title VII
93 Fairley vAndrews, 578 F3d 518,525-26 (7th Cir 2009).
94 578 F3d 518 (7th Cir 2009).
95 See id at 520.
96 See id at 525-26.
97 Id.
98 591 F3d 957 (7th Cir 2010).
99 See id at 958.
100 ADA § 102(a), 104 Stat at 331-32. Note, however, that the ADA was amended after
Serwatka was decided. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 5(a)(1), Pub L No 110-325,
122 Stat 3553,3557, codified in relevant part at 42 USC § 12112(a).
10 See Serwatka,591 F3d at 962.
102 Id at 961.
103 Interestingly, in applying Gross to the ADA, the Seventh Circuit cited its earlier holding in
McNutt v Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 141 F3d 706, 709 (7th Cir 1998), a decision
that held that Price Waterhouse continues to govern Title VII retaliation claims after the 1991 Act.
The Serwatka court cited McNutt for the proposition that where Congress changes one statute but
not another (such as amending the discrimination section-but not the retaliation section-of
Title VII), the amended standard should not apply to claims under the unamended section. See
Serwatka, 591 F3d at 962-63 (summarizing McNutt and noting that "McNutt is consistent with the
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retaliation case after Gross, extending the logic of its recent decisions
would appear to lead inexorably to the death of burden shifting. As
the Hayes and Zhang courts have already reasoned, the lack of
express incorporation of burden shifting by Congress would seem to
end burden shifting for Title VII retaliation claims.
B. Burden Shifting Applies to Title VII Retaliation Claims
The Fifth Circuit in Smith v Xerox Corp" was similarly confronted
with the question of how broadly to apply Gross. The issue was the
same as in Hayes and Zhang- how to interpret "because" in the
retaliation section of Title VII. The court began by acknowledging the
Seventh Circuit's decisions in Fairley and Serwatka and -that similar
reasoning could lead to the exclusion of burden shifting in the Title VII
retaliation context. Nevertheless, the court gave great weight to the
distinction in Gross between the ADEA and Title VII and ultimately
held that Price Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework still
govern Title VII retaliation claims.'o'
In Smith, the plaintiff had worked for Xerox as a sales
representative for twenty-two years. Although Kim Smith had
received positive evaluations and even a prestigious award for her
work, she was fired after she clashed with a new manager. The new
manager reduced Smith's sales area without reducing her sales goals.
He then gave Smith poor performance evaluations when she fell short
of her expected sales, which Smith characterized as "unreasonable"
compared to those of her peers."* She was placed on probation and
threatened with termination. After complaining within the company
to no avail, Smith filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that her new boss was
discriminating against her because of her age, race, and gender.
Shortly thereafter, she was fired. She then filed a second complaint
alleging retaliation. The jury was instructed on the mixed-motive
theory despite Xerox's objections. The jury denied the discrimination
claim, but also found that the fact that Smith had filed the first EEOC
charge was a motivating factor in her boss's decision to fire her and
that Xerox had failed to demonstrate that it would have taken the
same action even had Smith's boss not harbored any retaliatory
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Gross"). Yet the Serwatka court seemed to overlook the
fact that the ultimate result of McNua is the application of Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting
framework to a Title VII retaliation claim, even though Congress never added a "motivating factor"
provision to the retaliation section. See McNutt, 141 F3d at 709.
104 602 F3d 320 (5th Cir 2010).
1os See id at 328-29.
106 Id at 323.
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motive. As such, the jury awarded Smith $67,500 in compensatory
damages and $250,000 in punitive damages."
As in Hayes, the Fifth Circuit considered the significance of the
1991 Act. Notably absent from the Act's list of protected
characteristics susceptible to "motivating factor" liability is
retaliation- discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or
participating in enforcement proceedings.'os The Fifth Circuit
acknowledged the Seventh Circuit's broad holding that Gross bars
burden shifting "in all suits under federal law."' But the Fifth Circuit
also pointed out that Price Waterhouse is the Supreme Court's most
recent interpretation of "because" in Title VII itself, and that Gross
did not explicitly overrule Price Waterhouse." Moreover, the court
held that Congress's selective amendment of Title VII did not dislodge
Price Waterhouse in the retaliation context."' Because the Seventh
Circuit's broad interpretation of Gross would effectively overrule
Price Waterhouse-something the Supreme Court did not do-the
Fifth Circuit held that the Seventh Circuit's "simplified application of
Gross is incorrect.""
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the distinction in Gross
between Title VII and the ADEA. Because the distinction between
Title VII and the ADEA was crucial to the Supreme Court's
avoidance of its Price Waterhouse mixed-motive burden-shifting
precedent,"' the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Title VII was not affected
by Gross, and thus that Price Waterhouse still applied to Title VII
retaliation claims."' Moreover, the court felt bound by its own post-
1991 circuit precedent applying Price Waterhouse to Title VII
retaliation claims."' As a result, the court held that Smith could shift
the burden of proof to her employer by showing that a retaliatory
motive played a part in her employer's decision.
Dissenting in Smith, Judge Grady Jolly argued that the majority
drew a "meaningless distinction" and created "an unnecessary split in
the circuits" by ruling in conflict with the Seventh Circuit's decisions
107 Id at 323-25.
108 Smith, 602 F3d at 328.
109 Id at 328 n 25, quoting Fairley, 578 F3d at 525-26.
110 See Smith, 602 F3d at 328-29 ("It is not our place, as an inferior court, to renounce Price
Waterhouse as no longer relevant to mixed-motive retaliation cases, as that prerogative remains
always with the Supreme Court.").
111 Seeidat329.
112 Id at 328.
113 See id at 329 n 28 ("If Gross teaches anything, however, it is that Title VII and the
ADEA are distinct statutory schemes.").
114 Smith, 602 F3d at 330.
115 See id.
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in Fairley and Serwatka."M He argued that "Title VII's retaliation
section ... lacks the provision of Title VII's discrimination section that
allows mixed-motive cases" -a distinction that was "determinative" in
Gross."' Judge Jolly would have followed the Seventh Circuit's broad
reading of Gross and invalidated the burden-shifting framework
everywhere unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise."'
Judge Paul Friedman of the DC District Court has since sided
with the Fifth Circuit. Relying on pre-Gross DC Circuit precedent that
applied burden shifting throughout Title VII, Judge Friedman ruled
that Price Waterhouse still governs Title VII retaliation claims."9
C. The 1991 Act and Its Limited Remedies Provision Applies to
Retaliation Claims
A final district court case is particularly suggestive of the
confusion that has followed in the wake of Gross. Judge Rosemary
Collyer was faced with the difficult task of deciding how to proceed
when confronted by allegations of both retaliation and discrimination
under Title VII in the same case.no Because the "motivating factor"
provision added to Title VII by the 1991 Act creates liability where
"an impermissible motive animates 'any' employment practice," Judge
Collyer ruled that "[t]here can, therefore, be mixed-motive retaliation
cases despite the 'because' language in the statute." 2' However, this
was an apparent misreading of the statute; the "motivating factor"
provision added in 1991 said that "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice."22 Conspicuously absent from this list is
anything involving retaliation, a fact not lost on the Seventh and Fifth
Circuits.' Still, this misreading of the statute is a striking example of
the difficulty lower courts experience in trying to sort out what the
law is in this confusing and indeterminate area.'24 Because other courts
116 Id at 336 (Jolly dissenting).
117 Id at 338.
118 Smith, 602 F3d at 336 (Jolly dissenting).
119 Nuskey v Hochberg,70 F Supp 2d 1, 5 (DDC 2010).
120 See Beckham v National Railroad Passenger Corp, 736 F Supp 2d 130, 140-46 (DDC
2010) (analyzing each type of claim separately).
121 Id at 145 (citation omitted).
122 42 USC § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).
123 See Smith, 602 F3d at 328; McNutt, 141 F3d at 707-08.
124 For earlier examples of similar confusion following the passage of the 1991 Act, see Hall
v City of Brawley, 887 F Supp 1333, 1345 (SD Cal 1995) (applying the amended partial remedies
framework to a retaliation claim while apparently overlooking the absence of any explicit
amendment of the retaliation section of Title VII); Doe v Kohn Nast & Graf PC, 862 F
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have uniformly rejected this third approach,'25 the remainder of this
Comment focuses on the underlying assumptions of the first two
positions: whether Gross (as in Hayes and Zhang) or Price Waterhouse
(as in Smith) governs Title VII retaliation claims.
III. THE ORIGINAL SCOPE OF PRICE WATERHOUSE DETERMINES
WHETHER BURDEN SHIFTING APPLIES TO TITLE VII
RETALIATION CLAIMS
This Part shows that the uncertainty surrounding the applicability
of burden shifting in the Title VII retaliation context boils down to a
single question: whether Price Waterhouse, at the time it was decided,
applied to all of Title VII or only the discrimination provision. If
Price Waterhouse originally applied to all of Title VII, then it still does
today; if not, then it does not. Lower courts have so far overlooked
this critical question, beginning their analyses instead by summarily
stating (or even implicitly assuming) that Price Waterhouse did or did
not apply. Part III.A shows that if Price Waterhouse is assumed to have
originally applied throughout Title VII, then its burden-shifting
framework still applies today, because Gross did nothing to overrule
it. In contrast, Part III.B shows that if Price Waterhouse originally
applied only to the discrimination provision of Title VII, then but-for
causation proved solely by the plaintiff applies to retaliation claims, as
the ADEA and the retaliation provision of Title VII would then be
indistinguishable from the standpoint of Gross. This Part is agnostic
on the question of whether Price Waterhouse actually applies to
retaliation claims-the point is only to show that, regardless of the
answer, the initial determination about the scope of Price Waterhouse
drives the result.
Supp 1310, 1316 n 2 (ED Pa 1994) (same). On the subject of confusion in the employment law
context more generally, see Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination
Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 Mercer L Rev 651, 670 (2000)
(postulating that such confusion is "symptomatic of a larger problem: either the inability, or the
refusal, of a significant number of federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices, to recognize
the continuing significance that consideration of race and sex, for example, plays in the
decisionmaking process of our society").
125 See notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
126 Since Price Waterhouse arose in the context of a Title VII discrimination claim, courts
could easily assume that the decision applies only to the discrimination section. On the other
hand, Price Waterhouse arguably construed all of Title VII, considering its reliance on the shared
legislative history of Title VII, as well as the conceptual similarity of the discrimination and
retaliation provisions. Part IV explores which of these two interpretations is correct.
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A. If Price Waterhouse Originally Applied to All of Title VII
If Price Waterhouse originally applied throughout Title VII, then
burden shifting still applies to the retaliation provision.' Gross
interpreted the words "because of' in the ADEA, which the Supreme
Court had never interpreted before.' There was no ADEA precedent
on point. If Price Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework
originally applied to all of Title VII, however, then the retaliation
provision is not a similarly blank slate.2 9 If Price Waterhouse applied to
retaliation claims when it was decided in 1989, then burden shifting
governs at that point. When Congress revisited Title VII in 1991, it did
not change the retaliation provision in any way. The only way that
Congress can change the causation requirement for retaliation, as
created by the Supreme Court, is by changing the text itself.'" The key
question-and the one that has not received sufficient attention from
the courts-is whether Congress in 1991 was working with a
retaliation provision already governed by burden shifting, or rather
with a blank slate, like the ADEA.
127 Other arguments in favor of burden shifting for retaliation claims are extraneous or
irrelevant. For example, the Fifth Circuit insisted that the ADEA is somehow different from
Title VII, without explaining why. See Smith, 602 F3d at 329. The court even quoted Gross for the
idea that "we must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different
statute without careful and critical examination." Id, quoting Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349. Yet,
without any analysis, the Fifth Circuit simply stated that, because the claim in Smith was brought
under Title VII, Price Waterhouse (and circuit cases applying it) was the only precedent that
mattered. See Smith, 602 F3d at 329-30. What the Fifth Circuit overlooked was that the precise
reason the Supreme Court distinguished between Title VII and the ADEA was that the
discrimination provision of Title VII had been amended to codify burden shifting, whereas the
ADEA had not. See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349. This same state of affairs applies in the Title VII
retaliation context. See Part III.B.
128 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349 ("This Court has never held that this burden-shifting
framework applies to ADEA claims.").
129 For example, the Seventh Circuit's broad admonition that, "unless a statute ... provides
otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the plaintiff's burden in all suits under
federal law" falls flat if a prior Supreme Court decision established an alternative framework
prior to the 1991 Act. Fairley, 578 F3d at 525-26 (emphasis added). If extended to the Title VII
context, the validity of the Seventh Circuit's assertion depends on Price Waterhouse originally
applying only to discrimination claims-which might be true, but which must be demonstrated
rather than assumed. It is the necessary precursor to showing why Gross applies. By contrast, the
original scope of Price Waterhouse was properly irrelevant to the outcome of Serwatka because
Serwatka involved the ADA, which was not enacted until after Price Waterhouse, in 1990.
130 Moreover, even if we were attempting to infer intent from Congress's failure to amend
the Title VII retaliation provision in 1991, it is hard to believe that Congress would have
intended the death of burden shifting. It would be strange to infer that, by amending the
discrimination section to create a framework even more favorable to employees than the Price
Waterhouse framework, Congress somehow intended to overrule the moderately pro-employee
burden-shifting framework of Price Waterhouse for retaliation claims and replace it with the
employer-friendly approach of Gross.
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1. Congress's selective amendment of Title VII could not
dislodge existing retaliation precedent without changing the
text of the retaliation provision itself.
While a court may allow itself to be influenced by congressional
silence when interpreting a statute as a matter of first impression (as
the Supreme Court was in Gross), it is quite different-and
problematic-for a court to use congressional silence as a rationale
for overturning existing law."' As Earl Maltz points out, the intent of
Congress applies only insofar as it is embodied in the law itself: "in the
absence of majority concurrence, no change in the common law can be
adopted.".. Justice Wiley Rutledge expressed a similar sentiment
when he wrote that "in view of the specific and constitutional
procedures required for the enactment of legislation, it would seem
hardly justifiable to treat as having legislative effect" mere legislative
inaction."' In Gross, the Court did not treat Congress's selective
amendment as having legislative effect-it just took it into
consideration. However, if Price Waterhouse originally applied to
Title VII retaliation claims, then lower courts who decide burden
shifting no longer applies based on Gross are implicitly treating
legislative inaction as overruling existing law.
The point, then, is that Congress speaks only when acting
according to the procedures for passing laws spelled out in the
Constitution.' If Price Waterhouse originally applied to all of Title
131 See Midlantic National Bank v New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
474 US 494,501 (1986) ("The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent
specific."), citing Edmonds v Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 US 256, 266-67 (1979);
William N. Eskridge Jr, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich L Rev 67,94-95 (1988).
132 Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 71 BU L
Rev 767, 777 (1991). See also John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for
Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 BU L Rev 737, 741 (1984)
("[T]here exists no legal or functional justification for the imputation of any meaning to the
necessarily frequent and prolonged silences of Congress.").
133 Cleveland v United States, 329 US 14, 22 n 4 (1946) (Rutledge concurring). As Justice
Felix Frankfurter once observed, "[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of
corrective legislation a controlling legal principle." Helvering v Hallock, 309 US 106, 121 (1940).
Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall drew attention to "the realities of the legislative process"
when he observed that "it is generally difficult to infer from a failure to act any affirmative
conclusions." Goldstein v California, 412 US 546,577 (1973) (Marshall dissenting).
134 See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951 (1983) ("[T]he prescription for legislative action in
Art. 1, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure."). See also John F Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L
Rev 673, 707-10 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of the bicameralism and presentment
requirements); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U Miami L
Rev 375,376 (1992) ("A failure to follow the method results in no law.").
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VII, and yet lower courts follow Gross by refusing to allow burden
shifting, then they are overruling a prior Supreme Court decision
without Congress having done anything."'
2. Gross did not overrule Price Waterhouse.
Furthermore, if Price Waterhouse originally applied to retaliation
claims, then no change in that precedent can be drawn from Gross."
The Supreme Court in Gross tailored its opinion to limit its scope-
the Court was careful not to overrule prior precedents, most
particularly Price Waterhouse.' Gross required ADEA plaintiffs to
prove but-for causation without the aid of burden shifting,' but it
stopped short of saying that but-for causation proved solely by the
plaintiff applied elsewhere. Instead, the Court merely declined to
"extend[]" Price Waterhouse to the ADEA. 09
As the Supreme Court itself has explained, "If a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.".o The Supreme Court
does not overrule its own decisions by implication, so the carefully
crafted language of Gross should be taken seriously. Just as Congress's
selective amendment of Title VII should be treated as intentional (as
Gross tells us),"' the Supreme Court's selective change to the meaning
of "because" in the ADEA should be treated as intentional-and
135 Justice Antonin Scalia-himself in the majority in Gross-has argued forcefully against
drawing meaning from legislative inaction, explaining that "[iut is based, to begin with, on the
patently false premise that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by what
the current Congress desires, rather than by what the law as enacted meant." Johnson v
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 US 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia
dissenting). Moreover, "even accepting the flawed premise that the intent of the current
Congress ... is determinative, one must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw
any conclusions regarding that intent from the failure to enact legislation." Id at 671-72.
136 The court in Zhang appeared to assume that Gross overruled Price Waterhouse even
though the Supreme Court in Gross never explicitly did so, and even though Gross did not
involve Title VII. See Zhang, 2011 WL 940237 at *2.
137 The Hayes court, like others to have interpreted Gross broadly, evidently ignored the
self-limiting language of Gross when it said that Gross "makes clear that Price Waterhouse's
interpretation of 'because of' is flatly incorrect" without first showing why the retaliation
provision and the ADEA are indistinguishable. Hayes,762 F Supp 2d at 112.
138 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2352.
139 Id. See also id at 2349 ("This Court has never held that [the Title VII] burden-shifting
framework applies to ADEA claims. And we decline to do so now.").
140 Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 237 (1997), quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v
Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477, 484 (1989). See also Illinois Tool Work.% Inc v
Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28,33 (2006) ("[Tjhe duty of a court of appeals [is] to follow the
precedents of the Supreme Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them.").
141 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349.
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should not be extended to Title VII retaliation claims.14 In the same
way that Congress speaks only by passing laws, the Supreme Court
speaks only by issuing opinions."' As the Fifth Circuit has explained,
the prerogative of overruling Price Waterhouse "remains always with
the Supreme Court."" If the Court wanted to completely overrule
Price Waterhouse, it could have done so. It did not.
Some courts have so far resisted. this argument, concluding
instead that Gross overruled Price Waterhouse."' This has allowed
them to avoid deciding whether Price Waterhouse originally applied to
Title VII's retaliation provision in the first place, which is the crucial
question. For example, the Hayes court concluded that Price
Waterhouse did not matter because the Supreme Court criticized it in
Gross.'" The Gross Court said, as the Hayes court stressed, that "it has
become evident in the years since [Price Waterhouse] was decided that
its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply."" Yet the carefully
chosen language of Gross shows that Gross did nothing to alter the
applicability of Price Waterhouse."" Hayes also quoted Gross as saying
that "it is far from clear that the Court would have the same approach
were it to consider the question [of Price Waterhouse's mixed-motive
burden-shifting framework] today in the first.instance."." But if the
Supreme Court in Gross meant to overrule Price Waterhouse
completely, then it would not be "far from clear" that Price
Waterhouse was the right standard. Rather, it would be absolutely
certain that Price Waterhouse was not the right standard, because the
Court would have just said that Price Waterhouse is no longer
applicable in any context. Since the Court did not do so, we must once
again return to the initial question of the original scope of Price
Waterhouse.
142 See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the
Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L & Soc Inquiry 89, 107
(2005) ("The justices [ ] demonstrate their genuine concern for doctrine not only by issuing
opinions, but by frequently bargaining and negotiating among themselves over the specific
contents of their majority opinions, as if the precise wording of paragraphs and even single
sentences made a difference.").
143 See Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II, and Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court:
Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 Am J Polit Sci 294,297
(1998) (discussing how justices circulate draft opinions and bargain over language, because the
final opinions are what "contain legal rules that establish referents for future behavior and thus
have an impact beyond the parties in the litigation").
144 Smith, 602 F3d at 329.
145 See Zhang, 2011 WL 940237 at *2.
146 Hayes,762 F Supp 2d at 111-12.
147 Id at 112, quoting Gross, 129 S Ct at 2352.
148 See notes 143-44.
149 Hayes,762 F Supp 2d at 112, quoting Gross, 129 S Ct at 2351-52.
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This reasoning is critical to the application of Price Waterhouse to
Title VII retaliation claims, but has so far gone unstated in the lower
courts.' Gross did not overrule Price Waterhouse, and Congress did
not touch the retaliation provision in 1991 or thereafter. If burden
shifting applied to retaliation claims in 1989, then it still does today.
B. If Price Waterhouse Originally Applied Only to the
Discrimination Provision of Title VII
If instead Price Waterhouse is assumed to have originally applied
only to Title VII discrimination claims, then Gross dictates that burden
shifting is no longer available for retaliation claims. The crucial
question is whether the ADEA and Title VII were similarly
unburdened by Supreme Court precedent in 1991. If so, the negative
implication drawn from the selective amendment of Title VII in
1991-which was determinative in Gross-would apply with equal
force to the retaliation provision of Title VII. In Gross, the Supreme
Court was addressing the burden of proof in the ADEA context for
the first time."' If Title VII's retaliation provision is a similarly blank
slate today, then it is indistinguishable from the ADEA in Gross.
Indeed, if Price Waterhouse originally applied only to the Title VII
discrimination provision, the selective amendment rationale of Gross
arguably applies even more strongly to Title VII's retaliation provision
than it did to the ADEA in Gross because the retaliation provision is
in the same subchapter that Congress revisited in 1991.152 The only way
the retaliation provision would be different is if Price Waterhouse's
burden-shifting framework originally applied throughout Title VII. If
not, but-for causation proved solely by the plaintiff is the correct
result.
Lower courts have failed to grapple with this underlying question,
instead relying on various alternative (and inadequate) arguments to
reach an anti-burden-shifting result. First, courts applying Gross have
readily relied on Congress's selective amendment of Title VII as proof
that a different standard, namely but-for causation proved solely by
150 The Fifth Circuit merely said that Price Waterhouse remains "our guiding light" since it
interpreted "because" in Title VII, whereas Gross involved only the ADEA. Smith, 602 F3d
at 329. The Fifth Circuit made no actual argument regarding why Price Waterhouse applies to
retaliation claims in the first place; rather, it implicitly assumed that a decision about one part of
Title VII would naturally apply to the entire statute. In dissent, Judge Jolly made the opposite
assumption-evidenced by his suggestion that burden shifting applied only to retaliation claims
because the Fifth Circuit had extended Price Waterhouse to the retaliation context-and reached
the opposite result. See id at 336-38 (Jolly dissenting).
151 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2349.
152 See Hayes,762 F Supp 2d at 112.
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the plaintiff, should apply in all unamended contexts.' It is true that
Congress in 1991 altered the burden of proof for Title VII
discrimination claims without making similar changes elsewhere in the
statute -and that, given this new discrepancy, differences in language
should be treated as intentional.15 But this suggests only that Title VII
retaliation claims must be governed by a different standard than
Title VII discrimination claims, not that the Gross standard of but-for
causation proved solely by the plaintiff should necessarily apply. The
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework is, of course, different
from the framework created by Congress in 1991."' Lower courts can
still give full effect to the discontinuity created in the law by Congress
by continuing to apply Price Waterhouse to retaliation claims.
Second, courts have mistakenly reasoned that but-for causation
must apply to Title VII's retaliation provision because to do otherwise
would render the "motivating factor" provision added by Congress in
1991 mere surplusage. This argument was made forcefully by the
Hayes court, which pointed out that Congress felt compelled to amend
Title VII to include both a "motivating factor" provision (which
codified burden shifting for discrimination claims only) and a revised
remedies provision (which entitles discrimination plaintiffs to limited
recovery even where the employer disproves but-for causation)."' As
such, the Hayes court argued that "the only construction that gives
meaning both to [the limited remedies provision] as well as the
motivating-factor provision without reading either as surplusage is
one that restricts the motivating-factor provision's application to
Title VII discrimination claims only.""'
If Title VII is viewed statically as it existed in 1991, then the
surplusage argument makes a certain amount of sense. But the static
153 See, for example, id at 111-12 (dismissing at the outset the possibility that Price
Waterhouse originally applied to retaliation claims); Zhang, 2011 WL 940237 at *2. See also
Beckford v Giethner, 661 F Supp 2d 17, 25 n 3 (DDC 2009) (noting, in a cursory fashion, that the
reasoning of Gross "appears applicable to the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII" because the
ADEA and the retaliation section both use the word "because").
154 See, for example, Serwatka, 591 F3d at 961.
155 The 1991 Act allows the plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendant by
showing that a protected characteristic was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision. See
42 USC § 2000e-2(m). Similarly, Price Waterhouse allows the plaintiff to shift the burden of proof
by showing that a protected characteristic was a "substantial factor" in the employer's decision.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241 (plurality); id at 259-60 (White concurring); id at 276
(O'Connor concurring). The major difference is that Price Waterhouse gives the employer a
complete defense if it can disprove that consideration of a protected characteristic was a but-for
cause of its decision, while the 1991 Act still provides the employee with limited remedies (most
importantly, fees and costs) even where but-for causation is disproved. See Price Waterhouse,
490 US at 241 (plurality). See also 42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
156 See Hayes,762 F Supp 2d at 112-13.
157 Id at 113.
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perspective ignores the possibility that the Title VII retaliation
provision was already governed by Price Waterhouse's burden-shifting
framework before 1991. The only way that Congress in 1991 could
have changed the then-current law of causation for Title VII is by
directly amending the statute. Congress in 1991 amended the
discrimination provision but not the retaliation provision. If courts
interpret the 1991 Act as affecting the relevant standard of causation
under the retaliation provision (and if Price Waterhouse applied to the
retaliation provision prior to 1991), then they are holding that
Congress can overrule judicial interpretations of statutes without
changing the text of the specific provision at issue. Presumptions and
canons of construction are useful only where the proper interpretation
is not clear; they cannot overrule existing Supreme Court precedent
that interprets particular words as creating a particular standard of
a158causation."
IV. PRICE WATERHOUSE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO ALL OF TITLE VII,
AND BURDEN SHIFTING CONTINUES TO GOVERN TITLE VII
RETALIATION CLAIMS
Part III showed that, for burden shifting in Title VII retaliation
claims, whether Price Waterhouse originally applied to all of Title VII
or just to the discrimination provision is the crucial question. This Part
answers that question. The lower courts applying Gross have assumed
that because the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse brought only a
discrimination claim, burden shifting applied only to the
discrimination provision of Title VII. But this Part shows that the
more compelling argument is that Price Waterhouse was a decision
about all of Title VII for three reasons: (1) Price Waterhouse was
phrased broadly to apply throughout Title VII, and its reasoning relied
on the legislative history of all of Title VII; (2) the discrimination and
retaliation provisions are a conceptually linked package; and
(3) Gross and other lower courts have implicitly interpreted Price
Waterhouse as a decision applying to all of Title VII. If this analysis is
sound, then Price Waterhouse and its burden-shifting framework
necessarily still apply to Title VII retaliation claims today.
A. Price Waterhouse Construed All of Title VII, and Its Reasoning
Was Based on the Shared Legislative History of Title VII
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not distinguish
between the various provisions of Title VII. The Court framed its
158 See note 140 and accompanying text.
The University of Chicago Law Review
inquiry as relevant throughout the statute, explaining that "[w]e
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals
concerning the respective burdens of proof of a defendant and
plaintiff in a suit under Title VII when it has been shown that an
employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate motives.".. Conceptually, retaliation and discrimination
are equally illegitimate motives, so it stands to reason that the Court
was laying down a standard for all of Title VII's prohibitions."
Likewise, the Court said that "[t]he specification of the standard of
causation under Title VII is a decision about the kind of conduct that
violates that statute.""' When announcing the purpose of the law it was
construing, the Court used similarly expansive language: "Title VII
meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate considerations."l2 In deciding the case, the
Court said that the burden-shifting framework it was creating was
based on "Title VIPs balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives."'63 In sum, the Court's inquiry was phrased broadly as
relevant to all of Title VII, and its reasoning did not distinguish
between separate provisions.
Moreover, and regardless of the merits of using legislative history
as a guide to congressional intent,'"6 the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse relied extensively on the legislative history of Title VII in
determining that "because" meant the plaintiff could shift the burden
of proof to her employer.6 1 Price Waterhouse relied on the legislative
history of Title VII to strike a proper "balance of burdens" in accord
159 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 232 (plurality) (emphasis added). See also id at 263
(O'Connor concurring) ("The question for decision in this case is what allocation of the burden
of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the intent of Congress and the
purposes behind Title VII.").
160 See Part IV.B.
161 Price Waterhouse,490 US at 237 (plurality) (emphasis added).
162 Id at 241 (emphasis added).
163 Id at 243 (emphasis added). See also id at 260 (White concurring) ("I agree with Justice
Brennan that applying th[e burden-shifting] approach to causation in Title VII cases is not a
departure from, and does not require modification of, the Court's [prior] holdings.").
164 Whether and when legislative history is a useful guide to statutory interpretation has
been hotly debated. See, for example, Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S Cal L Rev 845, 848-61 (1992) (listing examples of the beneficial uses of
legislative history, which include avoiding absurd results, correcting drafting errors, determining
specialized meanings, and identifying the "reasonable purpose" of a statute); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 539 (1983) (arguing that turning to
legislative history to "fill in blanks" is "a sort of creation," which is illegitimate "without some
warrant-other than the existence of the blank").
165 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 239 n 4, 243-44 (plurality); id at 262-63 (O'Connor
concurring).
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with "Title VII's balance of rights."'" Significantly, the debates of the
enacting Congress never hinted at a difference in standards for
retaliation and discrimination claims. Thus, neither the Court itself
nor the primary source on which it relied distinguished between the
two provisions.
Burden shifting also effectuates the intent of the enacting
Congress. In her Price Waterhouse concurrence, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor quoted Senator Joseph Clark for the proposition that
Title VII "simply eliminates consideration of color [and other
protected characteristics] from the decision to hire or promote."'" But
the most relevant statement regarding Title VII comes from Senator
Hubert Humphrey: "What the bill does ... is simply to make it an
illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment.".
Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that the Eighty-Eighth
Congress-which enacted Title VII-did not intend the word
"because" to require but-for causation."' In particular, a proposed
amendment to Title VII would have made liability contingent on a
protected characteristic being the sole basis for the employer's
decision. But this amendment was rejected, because it would render
the statute, in the words of Senator Clifford Case, "totally nugatory."...
In sum, the Price Waterhouse framework best captures the intent of
the enacting Congress for all of Title VII.
166 Id at 245 (plurality).
167 See Sandra Tafuri, Title VII's Antiretaliation Provision:Are Employers Protected after the
Employment Relationship Has Ended?, 71 NYU L Rev 797, 808 (1996) ("Only scant legislative
history exists on section 704(a) [the retaliation provision]."); Edward C. Walterscheid, A
Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct as Protected Expression under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 29 BC L Rev 391, 393 (1988) (observing the "almost total absence of any
legislative history" for Title VII's retaliation provision, and noting that the committee reports
that exist "simply repeat certain language of Section 704(a) without any explanation of its
meaning"). See also Green v McDonnell Douglas Corp, 463 F2d 337,341 (8th Cir 1972) (noting
that the legislative history of Title VII provides "no guidance as to the scope of protection
afforded by [the retaliation provision]").
168 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 265 (O'Connor concurring), quoting 110 Cong Rec
S 7218 (Apr 8,1964) (Sen Clark).
169 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 265 (O'Connor concurring), quoting 110 Cong Rec
S 13088 (June 9, 1964) (Sen Humphrey) (emphasis added). There are-as is usually the case
among the volumes of legislative history-some statements that arguably contradict these
sentiments. See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 281 (Kennedy dissenting) ("To discriminate is to
make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor."), quoting 110 Cong Rec at S 7213
(cited in note 168) (Joint Memorandum by Sen Clark and Sen Case). But, importantly, there are
no inklings in the legislative history that the discrimination and retaliation provisions should be
treated differently. See note 167.
170 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241 n 7, citing 110 Cong Rec S 2728 (Feb 10,1964) (Sen
Dowdy); 110 Cong Rec S 13837 (June 15,1964) (Sen Case).
171 See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum L Rev 292, 297 (1982), quoting 110 Cong Rec at S 13837
(cited in note 170) (Sen Case).
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B. The Discrimination and Retaliation Provisions Are Conceptually
Linked and Price Waterhouse Applies to Both
Several federal statutes -including Title VII and the ADEA-
prohibit both discrimination itself and retaliation for having opposed
such prohibited discrimination. The provisions are part and parcel of
each other, and when they are (1) enacted together by the same
Congress and (2) use identical language-like the discrimination and
retaliation provisions of Title VII-it makes it more likely that they
are intended to be interpreted identically. Recently, the Supreme
Court had occasion to consider the conceptual relationship between
discrimination and retaliation provisions in the ADEA. As Justice
O'Connor explained, "Retaliation against a person because that
person has complained of [ ] discrimination is another form of
intentional [] discrimination.... Retaliation is, by definition, an
intentional act. It is a form of 'discrimination' because the
complainant is being subjected to differential treatment."172
The Supreme Court later cited this analysis approvingly, affirming
that it roundly rejected the argument "that a claim of retaliation is
conceptually different from a claim of discrimination."'. At other
times, however, the Court has suggested that discrimination and
retaliation are somewhat distinct. As Justice Breyer explained in a
Title VII case:
The antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where
individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial,
ethnic, religious, or gender-based status. The antiretaliation
provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's
basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to prevent
injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The
antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals
based on what they do, i.e., their conduct."'
Whatever the theoretical intricacies, the discrimination and
retaliation provisions are part of a conceptually linked package. This
bolsters the application of a uniform standard of proof.
Both provisions also present similar problems of proof for
plaintiffs, because liability under either depends on the plaintiff being
172 Jackson v Birmingham Board of Education, 544 US 167,173-74 (2005).
173 Gomez-Perez v Potter, 553 US 474,481 (2008).
174 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co v White,548 US 53,63 (2006) (citation omitted).
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able to prove what her employer was thinking." The Court in Price
Waterhouse understood that it is difficult for a plaintiff to parse the
precise weighting of different motivations in her boss's mind
concerning an adverse employment decision. Thus, the employee can
shift the burden of proof to make the employer provide the necessary
explanation for various mental motivations, some of which might have
been legitimate while others were not.' Since the retaliation provision
is an enforcement mechanism for the discrimination provision and is
characterized by a similar proof problem, burden shifting under both
makes the Title VII scheme as a whole conceptually consistent. Given
the interrelatedness of the dual prohibitions on discrimination and
retaliation, a burden-shifting framework spanning the whole of
Title VII is the most persuasive reading of Price Waterhouse.
The context in which Price Waterhouse was decided similarly sheds
light on its broad scope. At the time, the provisions of Title VII used the
same "because" formulation, and courts generally seek to interpret the
words within a statute in an internally consistent manner."' While the
1991 Act altered only the discrimination provision of Title VII, this
change was still a few years away when Price Waterhouse was decided;
in 1989, the two provisions were still part of the same linked package,
unchanged since 1964. Unsurprisingly, Title VII cases were generally
thought to apply throughout the entire statute.'" Since both provisions
used the same words at the time Price Waterhouse was decided, burden
shifting naturally applied to both Title VII retaliation and
discrimination claims.
C. Gross Implicitly Acknowledged the Statute-Wide Scope of
Price Waterhouse
Even the Supreme Court in Gross arguably acknowledged
implicitly the statute-wide scope of Price Waterhouse. As Justice
Thomas observed, "[T]he ADEA is [not] controlled by Price
Waterhouse, which initially established that the burden of persuasion
15 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2358-59 (Breyer dissenting) ("All that a plaintiff can know for
certain in such a context is that the forbidden motive did play a role in the employer's
decision."); Malone, 9 Stan L Rev at 67 (cited in note 62).
176 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 250 (plurality) ("It is fair that [the employer] bear the
risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly
created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own
wrongdoing.").
17 See, for example, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Keystone Consolidated Industries,
Inc, 508 US 152, 159 (1993) ("[Ildentical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning."), quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc v United States,
286 US 427,433 (1932).
178 See Womack v Munson, 619 F2d 1292,1296 (8th Cir 1980).
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shifted in alleged mixed-motives Title VII claims." 7 ' The Court even
contextualized its earlier decision within the case law by saying that
"[i]n Price Waterhouse, this Court addressed the proper allocation of
the burden of persuasion in cases brought under Title VII ... when an
employee alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action
because of both permissible and impermissible considerations.,,. Most
revealingly, the Court in Gross was particularly careful not to overrule
Price Waterhouse and instead merely declined to "extend[]" burden
shifting to the ADEA."' Taken together, this language not only
demonstrates the basis for the recent confusion, but also suggests that
burden shifting should continue to apply to Title VII retaliation claims.
Lower court decisions both before and after Price Waterhouse
contain similar confirmations of the broad original scope of Price
Waterhouse. For example, in discussing the scope of Price Waterhouse
with respect to the ADA, the Seventh Circuit in Sewatka said, "Price
Waterhouse dealt solely with Title VII."n As the Eleventh Circuit has
explained, "[T]he 1991 Act overruled and limited the mixed-motive
defense only in discrimination cases based on race, color, religion, sex
and national origin, but left the defense intact for retaliation cases.""
In an earlier case, the Seventh Circuit summed up best the state of
Title VII retaliation claims pre-Gross: "The continued viability of the
mixed-motive affirmative defense in the arena of retaliation cases [is]
uncontested.""' If lower courts ignore this evidence and instead apply
Gross to Title VII retaliation claims, they will overrule Price
Waterhouse completely, something the Supreme Court was careful not
to do."'
This analysis has several implications. Hayes and the other courts
holding that burden shifting is unavailable for Title VII retaliation
claims are incorrect, because they mistakenly assume that Price
Waterhouse was a decision only about the discrimination section of
Title VII and so does not bind them. On the other side, Smith and the
other courts holding that burden shifting is available in the retaliation
context are correct, although they too gave insufficient consideration
179 Gross, 129 S Ct at 2351 (emphasis added).
180 Id at 2347.
181 Id at 2352.
182 See Serwatka, 591 F3d at 959 (emphasis added).
183 Pennington v City of Huntsville, 261 F3d 1262,1269 (11th Cir 2001).
184 Speedy v Rexnord Corp, 243 F3d 397,402 (7th Cir 2001).
185 See Gross, 129 S Ct at 2352 (declining to "extend[]" Price Waterhouse to the ADEA).
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to the key question of whether Price Waterhouse, when originally
decided, applied to all of Title VII. Outside of Title VII, this conclusion
shows that the admonition of the Seventh Circuit-that but-for
causation proved solely by the plaintiff applies under every federal
statute unless Congress says otherwise-is overly broad, because it
fails to recognize the continued vitality of Price Waterhouse, a
Supreme Court decision, in creating a burden-shifting framework for
the Title VII retaliation context.
CONCLUSION
If Price Waterhouse originally applied to all of Title VII, it still
does today. Congress has not amended the retaliation section, and
since Gross did not overrule Price Waterhouse, its burden-shifting
framework remains the governing precedent. Price Waterhouse
originally applied to all of Title VII based on (1) its broadly framed
inquiry and its reliance on the shared legislative history of Title VII,
(2) the conceptual equivalence of the discrimination and retaliation
provisions, and (3) Gross's implicit acknowledgement of Price
Waterhouse's statute-wide scope. The point is not to unduly limit the
application of Gross but rather to put Gross in context -as a decision
whose reasoning was tailored specifically to the ADEA, and one
issued against a complex backdrop of statutory and judicial history. In
context, Gross does not reach the retaliation provision of Title VII,
and Price Waterhouse and its more employee-friendly burden-shifting
framework continue to apply.
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